Violence in Afghanistan has brought
advantages to some combat groups. Conrad
Schetter terms their activity as war
enterprises.
The term 'economy of violence' focuses on a
self-perpetuating system, in which violence
itself emerges as a marketable good. From an
economic point of view the immense number of
combat groups which existed at least until
the appearance of the Taliban in 1994 can be
regarded as 'war enterprises' adapted to a
'market of violence'. Their main capital was
their armaments and their main business was
the maintenance of security for a certain
territory and its inhabitants.
It has to be stressed that, through the
emergence of these combat groups, the
vocational training of an entire society
changed drastically. Due to the devastation
of agricultural resources, the inclination
to be trained in agricultural or pastoral
techniques declined. The ordinary Afghan
adapted his labour to the shifting economic
situation in Afghanistan. Membership in a
combat unit was much more profitable and
even more secure than a civil occupation,
such as being a farmer, with the daily risk
of stepping on a land mine and without
adequate arms for self-defence.
Membership in a combat unit was not as
precarious as it seems at first glance. The
main tasks of these units were to collect
taxes from the inhabitants in return for
ensuring security and to take tolls from
foreigners crossing their checkpoints. The
militias were the largest and best-paying
employers. The guarantee of security was the
fundamental reason for the existence of
these combat units. Thus, generation or
maintenance of a feeling of general
insecurity was the driving force which made
the combat units indispensable. Lootings,
raids and plundering of rival villages, as
well as the occupation of third-party
property, not only promised a material
profit, but were also the main strategies in
upholding a general feeling of insecurity.
Impending danger underlined the necessity
for the existence of combat units. As long
as the inhabitants of an area were in fear
of raids by neighbouring enemies, they would
support the militia.
Only the Taliban, who emerged in 1994,
managed to monopolize the 'economy of
security'. In other words, one of the
essential reasons for the emergence and the
success of the Taliban was the initial lack
of security, which particularly affected the
traders. Ahmed Rashid [the author of
Taliban] highlighted the alliance
between the Taliban and the Pakhtoon trade
networks. The traders expected high profits
from the re-establishing of secure trade
routes through Afghanistan. Previously the
traders had to pay various combat units at
dozens of checkpoints. Through the emergence
of a transit trade, the Taliban received a
profitable source of revenue.
The Taliban required these revenues to bribe
and employ the previously independent combat
units. Thus, the strategy of the Taliban was
to absorb the combat units, who directly
profited from the security business in the
past, into their own ranks. The maintenance
of the state of belligerency as well as the
omnipresence of the Taliban guaranteed the
sustained employment of these warriors.
Nevertheless, due to several defeats of the
Taliban with high casualties (e.g. in
Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 and in Shomali in
1999), being a soldier lost its
attractiveness for many combatants, who
increasingly preferred to accept a more
secure occupation (e.g. in trade or opium
cultivation) than to risk their lives on the
frontline.
Cultivation of opium
Probably the most prominent branch of the
Afghan war economy is the cultivation of
opium. Already in the 1980s some combat
units started to plant opium on a large
scale in the Helmand valley. Combat units
allied with the resistance parties (e.g.
Harakat-i-Inqilab) as well as with the
Afghan government were involved in this
business. The cultivation of opium increased
and spread steadily. In many places the
agricultural land which was cleared of mines
was immediately cultivated to grow opium.
Although the profit of the opium business
lies almost exclusively in its trade, as
expounded in the contribution by
Schulenburg, farmers gain a much more
regular and higher profit from opium than
from cultivating other crops. The war
parties also gained from the opium
cultivation by collecting a tax of 20 per
cent on harvested opium from the dealers. In
1999, the peak of the Afghan opium
production was reached: in that year 75 per
cent of all global seizures of opiates were
produced in Afghanistan.
Pressure from the UN resulted in a ban on
the cultivation of opium which was imposed
by the Taliban in 2000. According to a
recent UNDCP report (http:www.undcp.org),
the planting of opium almost came to a
complete stop in 2001. It is difficult to
comprehend why the Taliban decided to
abolish the cultivation and production of
opium. It is probably too early to give a
satisfying answer
Trans-border trade
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a
new geopolitical interest of several
countries in the Central Asian states, known
as the New Great Game. In this context
Afghanistan, situated on the southern rim of
the Central Asian states, gained an enormous
geo-economic importance. Under the rule of
the Taliban south and west Afghanistan
became the turnstile of smuggling between
Pakistan, Dubai, Iran and Turkmenistan.
Based on the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
(ATTA) dating back to the 1950s, goods were
permitted to be imported tax-free via
Pakistan (Karachi) into landlocked
Afghanistan. Already in the 1970s the ATTA
was misused for smuggling: goods arriving in
Afghanistan via Pakistan were smuggled back
to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Pakistan, where they were sold in
open bazars. While this smuggling decreased
in the period of the Soviet occupation, it
emerged again with the advent of the
Taliban, but this time on a larger scale and
via several trade routes.
Christine
Noelle-Karimi is visiting professor at the
department of Iranian studies, University of
Bamberg.
Conrad Schetter works for the Centre of
Development Research, University of Bonn.
Reinhard Schlagintweit, a German career
diplomat, is chairman of the German National
Committee for Unicef.
This is a collection of papers presented by
various experts at an international
conference in Munich in June 2000. The
authors analyze the historical, political
and economic mechanisms that have led to the
present lack of state structures in
Afghanistan. |
|
|
