This book
co-authored by Pravin Sawhney and Lt Gen
Sood on the ten months of military
mobilization by India in 2001/02 is a better
book than Sawhney's earlier book on India's
security titled Demystifying Defence.
Perhaps, it is the writing skills and
experience of General Sood that contributed
to the better quality of this research
product.
Comprising seven chapters, the book looks at
various issues such as regional politics
post 9/11, the geo-political and
geo-strategic context in which the operation
by India was launched, New Delhi's
objectives, the role of the US during the
conflict, the role of nuclear proliferation
in affecting the outcome of the operation,
and India and Pakistan's comparative
conventional capabilities.
The basic conclusion of this book is that
Operation Parakram was an unsuccessful
operation botched mainly due to the gap in
the political and military vision in India.
The authors are of the view that the
conventional military balance was not
pronounced to guarantee India a decisive
victory. In addition, New Delhi's nuclear
deterrence posture was not of the scale that
would ensure positive dividends in terms of
impressing Pakistan.
In fact, there was a certain gap between
India's political and military objectives
and the way it played its diplomatic game.
At the end, New Delhi could not manage to
convince the international community,
especially the US, to bear maximum pressure
on Islamabad to withdraw support to the
militants fighting in Kashmir.
Thus, one of the conclusions is that the
Indian leadership failed to see that the
developments in 9/11 had made Musharraf much
too precious to Washington. So, instead of
Pakistan turning into a pariah state, it
became the US's strategic partner with
American leadership becoming extremely
conscious of the Pakistani
general-turned-president's importance for
Washington's war against terrorism.
Unfortunately, as stated by the authors, New
Delhi could not correctly fathom American
sensitivity to the events of 9/11 or that
India's logic would not work.
In any case, as has been argued at several
places in the book, one of the gaps was
India's US policy. Sawhney and Sood's debate
on India-US relations is in the same strain
as Karnad's, who is also of the view that
India does not have the nerve to realize its
dream of becoming a regional power. One of
the arguments is that the new American
engagement in India is almost a pre-planned
American move aiming at neutralizing India's
nuclear power.
Sadly enough, India tends to get cold feet
in the face of American diplomatic pressure.
Therefore, to the authors, President
Musharraf appears more politically suave
because he managed to fathom the import of
American mood better than the Indians, who
thought that they could manage to link
Pakistan's aid to the militants with post
9/11 developments.
The conclusion in the first chapter, thus,
is that New Delhi has a serious problem
comprehending America's strategic approach
towards South Asia, particularly
Washington's ambition to keep the South
Asian nuclear and ballistic missile
development in check.
This statement is followed by an analysis of
militancy in the region, particularly the
picture after 9/11. However, some of the
conclusions in the second chapter are
problematic. For instance, the authors
contend that Pakistan had no control over
the Taliban despite these Afghan warriors
being Islamabad's creation.
Again, it is held that Pakistan's ISI had no
role in the hijacking of IC 184 that had
resulted in the release of Maulana Masood
Azhar. In fact, this chapter betrays the
authors' lack of knowledge of Pakistan's
military establishment and the politics
behind the support to the militants.
However, one cannot disagree with the
argument that the events of 9/11 and
American reaction to it let Musharraf out of
the tight corner where he found himself
prior to 2001.
It was in this environment that Operation
Parakram was launched. The plan, according
to the authors was conceived by the northern
command to be later accepted by India's Army
HQs. Sawhney and Sood highlight one of the
biggest problems of the operation: the
inability to integrate political objectives
in the operational plans and to explain to
the military that the idea was not just to
initiate a war.
Incidentally, the authors make the same
argument as the Pakistan Army in one of its
explanations for Kargil. The new theory is
that the Kargil plan was intended to be a
smaller operation that just got out of
control. Both arguments are not plausible.
And if these are true then one needs to ask
questions regarding the sanity of the
policymakers.
Whatever the origin of the operation, the
fact of the matter, and as pointed out by
the authors, is that India failed to attain
its objectives. It definitely failed to
impress Islamabad. This was partly due to
India's apprehension that Islamabad might
use its nuclear weapons if India initiated
hostilities. Clearly, India was not in a
position to dominate its adversary through
conventional military means.
The problem, hence, was India's inability to
calculate its own reaction in a situation
where its nuclear deterrence was flawed as
has been pointed out in the sixth chapter.
To have a strong nuclear deterrence New
Delhi would have to develop a strategy and
buildup its programme that it does not
appear willing to do under immense American
pressure that is both direct and indirect.
So, despite the claims made by some Indian
generals that it was four times that India
was close to starting a war, the fact is
that New Delhi had lost its initiative soon
after it mobilized its forces.
Furthermore, the American pressure played a
key role in keeping India in check. This
leads to one of the conclusions in the book
that the US has a role in South Asia. While
this assertion might not be beneficial to
both parties, the reality is that it is the
continued pressure from Washington that
might lead to Pakistan amending its rather
problematic Kashmir policy.
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