Katerina Dalacoura argues that human rights
and the principle of toleration are based on
the belief that there is a universal human
nature which we all share.
There are two ideas we must clarify and
state our disagreement with. The first is
the claim that the conflict between
authenticity and human rights is in reality
a non-issue, because the problem with human
rights derives from states, not cultures.
Human rights violations are endemic in the
state system. Evidence for this can easily
be produced by pointing out the remarkable
similarity of human rights violations
throughout the world. Many claim that
violations are a political matter irrelevant
to culture, the obvious point being that no
culture supports torture or genocide or such
other gross abuses of human rights in
principle.
This is a powerful argument but it builds on
a number of confusions. The first is that
the rights of individuals are held against
the state only and not also (in a manner of
speaking) against society. This is not the
case, as I have pointed out. I have already
argued that it is very difficult to separate
the private from the public in the
understanding of the rights-holding
individual, because the former will
inevitably influence the latter. If we
narrow the discussion of human rights to
those relevant to the state, we may find it
easier to argue that human rights are only a
result of state structures, but we will be
failing to grasp the problem in its
totality.
The second confusion, which is closely
related to the first, is that because a
culture does not uphold a notion it
necessarily abhors it. It is, of course,
true that no society or culture advocates
torture or genocide in principle, but this
is not the point. The point is that many
societies would place other priorities
higher than the sanctity of the individual
and not hesitate to sacrifice individuals as
a means to achieving those priorities. The
issue surely is not that a society upholds
torture or genocide per se, but that it does
not uphold the concept of the rights-holding
individual.
The state is both protector and violator of
human rights. No evidence can be produced to
support the contention that it is
necessarily the one or the other. On the one
hand, power can be abused and people
regularly do abuse it. On the other hand,
the state protects members of society from
each other and lays down the law. What must
be clear, however, is that although the
state can and often is autonomous from
society, it is also part of it and hence an
expression of its culture.
It is hard to conceive of a society which
abhors human rights violations being ruled,
for a very long time, by a state that
persistently violates human rights. The
reverse is also true. No state can decree
that a society must respect human rights,
although it can take steps to promote them.
A state has to have some kind of legitimacy,
not necessarily democratic, in order to
survive. If a state is not de-legitimized by
human rights violations we have to look at
the culture of the society over which it
rules for at least some of the explanations.
Our concern with authenticity and culture
and with their crucial role in a normative
discussion on human rights then becomes
self-explanatory.
The second issue that has led to much
confusion is cultural relativism. In very
simple terms, cultural relativism is the
statement that values are relative to
circumstance, in this case culture, and that
because it is only culture that validates
values we can pass no judgment on them. We,
therefore, arrive at the principle of
toleration, not through respect for other
people's right to define themselves freely,
but rather through our disbelief that any
moral standard exists against which we can
judge values.
* * * * *
It must be noted that a principled defence
of cultural relativism did originate as a
reaction to the arrogance of Western
attitudes towards other societies. In the
1920s and 1930s it was a counter-argument,
put forward by some Western anthropologists,
to the 19th century belief that non-Western
societies are inferior to Western societies
and would gradually evolve along similar
lines.
Cultural relativism was thus a reaction to
evolutionism and imperialism, and has been
described, with some justification, as an
ally of liberalism. This may have been the
honourable intention, but it could not have
the desired effect. The fact that cultural
relativists opposed imperialism and cultural
arrogance by one part of the world did not
make them champions of human rights.
If tolerance is based on respect for other
people's liberty, then it is a legitimate
concern for someone who believes in human
rights, and it is worth weighing it against
other considerations of freedom. If,
however, it is based on a belief that,
because everything is defined by
circumstance and history, nothing is more or
less morally valid, then it stultifies
dialogue between cultures.Once we have
clarified the two issues, which have
bedevilled discussion of human rights, we
can begin to tackle our main problem. The
world is made up of people who live in
different societies and cultures. These
cultures give rise to different moralities,
not all supportive of human rights.
We cannot solve the problem by ascribing all
responsibility to the state (if we did there
would be no need for a normative discussion
of human rights), so we cannot in effect
proclaim that the solution to all problems
regarding human rights is democratization in
the sense of majority rule. How then are we
to think about human rights and their
universality? How are we to reconcile belief
in the sanctity of the individual with the
possibility that individuals may
collectively reject this principle?
A number of solutions have been offered to
resolve this dilemma and we need to examine
them one by one. The first proposes that we
concentrate on basic rights which can be
agreed on universally. These involve the
elements of freedom and security which are
part and parcel of all human existence and
accepted by any culture. It is argued that
if we focus on these rights we have a goal
to which we can realistically aspire
globally but also one that is not morally
controversial.
The proposition of basic rights has much to
commend it but it does not resolve our
problem. This is because, as has been argued
here, our primary concern is not whether we
can agree on what rights to uphold or reject
but whether we can agree on the very concept
of the rights-holding individual. It is one
thing to say that all cultures provide, in
an ideal form, for the basic requirements of
humanity and human dignity (they all do) and
quite another that they would all recognize
the inalienable right of any individual to
lay claim on them, if these were denied for
some reason. Once this distinction becomes
our focus, it may be realized that basic
rights are not a 'neutral' proposition which
can be endorsed by all societies.
* * * * *
A second way in which the justification of
human rights can be attempted is through the
discovery of cross-cultural universals.
According to this line of thought, all
cultures share some principles which provide
(actually or potentially), a grounding for
human rights. They include a universal
aversion to death and injury; what has been
called the principle of 'retribution tied to
proportionality'; some notion of freedom; or
of human dignity. It is argued that each
culture contains some norms that would be
conducive to human rights and that these
norms can be discovered through empirical
research.
The eclectic cross-cultural approach has
much to commend it because it is only from
within that a culture can support human
rights. But its limitations can be easily
pointed out. The obvious point is that even
if we accept that universals do exist we
cannot take it for granted that they are
supportive of human rights. There is a real
possibility that there exist universals
which are antithetical to human rights.
The solution of establishing the lowest
common denominator between cultures as
regards rights is also unsatisfactory,
because even if it could somehow be
discovered it would not protect all basic
rights (and would certainly sacrifice
women's rights). The search for universals
therefore, although the most useful way of
encouraging global support for human rights,
does not resolve the philosophical problem
of cross-cultural toleration, unless it
could be shown that a universal norm
regarding the rights-holding individual did
exist.
Similar objections can be raised to the
arguments that human rights should be
justified on the basis of human needs. We
can all agree that humans share a need for
security, subsistence, shelter, and some
basic freedoms - but this can inform our
discussion of what should be the precise
list of rights, not prove that people have a
right that these needs be fulfilled. Even
the very elementary point that the survival
of the human race must be secured does not
logically lead to respect for universal
rights - it smacks of utilitarianism which
is a theory that can be conducive to general
human welfare but could sacrifice for its
sake the rights of individuals.
The next set of arguments which we must
consider in attempting to reconcile human
rights and the principle of toleration
pertain to human nature. Indeed, the belief
that there is a universal human nature which
we all share and that we can derive the
principles or rights from it lies at the
heart of a very common (perhaps the most
common) conception of natural law and
natural rights. But it is not convincing.
Deriving the idea of human rights from
observing human nature is deriving an
'ought' from an 'is'. To defend human rights
one needs to believe that a 'core' of
humanness exists beneath and beyond cultural
diversity. But this is a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition.
It must by now be clear that all the above
attempts to reconcile the principles of
human rights with the value of authenticity
(and hence with toleration) between
societies and cultures fail. This is because
human rights must be based on a moral and
metaphysical view of the individual which
takes priority over all else. This view
cannot be objectively defended. The
arguments presented above either implicitly
take this view for granted or do not
countenance it.
To claim that any of the above arguments is
successful is to avoid a dilemma which, in
its extreme form, can truly be a tragic one.
It is the dilemma of the liberal when faced
with a person or society which defines
itself in a way that is antithetical to the
notion of rights, and which gives priority
to other moral values such as solidarity or
compassion, or upholds the 'law of God; or
the law of communal tradition. Such a person
or community can claim a wholly different,
authentic existence which is alien to the
notion of rights and yet may be a
satisfactory and happy one.
The tragedy of the liberal is that he or she
cannot accept it as morally justifiable
without abandoning his or her principles.
The liberal position cannot endorse a
society which is not liberal just because it
is 'authentic' - because this society
comprises individuals some of whom may wish
to be free, now or in the future, but may be
unable to be so. In that sense, in the
liberal viewpoint, personal authenticity
must take precedence over cultural or
societal authenticity and individual rights
are given priority over collective rights.
Katerina Dalacoura
is a lecturer of International Relations at
the London School of Economics.
This book attempts to answer the question
whether human rights constitute a universal
norm or a Western value. It specially
analyzes the position of human rights in
Islamic societies. The author reaches the
conclusion that the interpretation of Islam
in relation to human rights principles is
not static but is subject to reformulation
under the impact of social and economic
developments. |
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