Prof Muhammad A. Hakim analyzes the
development of the parliamentary system in
Bangladesh.
The global democratic revolution of the late
twentieth century that Huntington termed
"the third wave" swept through many hitherto
authoritarian parts of the world. Bangladesh
was also caught in this ostensibly
democratic wave. The first two decades
(1971-1990) of Bangladeshi politics are
marked by a plethora of successful and
abortive military coups, intermittent
movements for the restoration of a
democratic system, rigged elections, an
ineffective legislature called the Jatiya
Sangsad (JS), and the omnipotence of chief
executives who subordinated all institutions
of government and administration to their
personal whims.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in whose name the war
of liberation was fought, formed the first
government after independence. Under his
leadership, the Constituent Assembly in 1972
introduced a Westminster-type of
parliamentary system which was eventually
replaced by a one-party presidential
authoritarianism. Those who, before
independence, saw a champion of democracy in
Sheikh Mujib were, to some extent,
disillusioned by his undemocratic conduct in
running the state affairs. An analyst of
Bangladesh politics branded his method of
politics, a bit exaggeratedly, as the
Zamindari style.
A new era in Bangladesh politics, which can
legitimately be called the militarized era,
began with the assassination of Sheikh Mujib
and the collapse of the Awami League (AL)
government in a coup d'etat in August 1975.
The two Generals who ruled Bangladesh
between 1975 and 1990 were Ziaur Rahman and
H.M. Ershad. The major political
developments of this period had been the
formation of political parties by the
Generals - Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
by Ziaur Rahman and Jatiya Party (JP) by
Ershad - and the reintroduction of at least
a semblance of a multi-party system, holding
of referenda, and presidential and
parliamentary elections.
The first four parliamentary elections, held
between 1973 and 1988 were alleged to be
considerably flawed although the intensity
of electoral frauds varied. Fraudulent
practices in parliamentary elections began
with the first parliamentary polls held in
1973. The intensity of such practices
increased during the second and third JS
elections held in 1979 and 1986
respectively, and surpassed all previous
records of intimidation, ballot stuffing,
and surreptitious counting in the fourth JS
elections held in 1988.
The major purpose of these elections was not
to offer the electorate an opportunity to
exercise the right to vote, but to convince
the donor countries and organizations that a
democratically elected government was in
power. The divergence in the preferences of
the ruler and the society was the main
reason why the elections were characterized
by state-sponsored rigging. It is obvious
that the preference of the society was to
have a genuinely elected government while
the preference of the rulers was to ensure
their continuation in power by any means.
Sheikh Mujib, Ziaur Rahman and Ershad
treated the Election Commission (EC), a
constitutional body, as one of the many
government departments. Although during each
of the parliamentary elections held between
1973 and 1988 the EC was headed by a judge
of the highest court of the country, it
miserably failed to make these elections
free and fair. The four elections completely
shattered public confidence in the sanctity
of the electoral process.
Allegedly rigged elections contributed
enormously to the ineffectiveness of the
first JS. The legislature remained
substantially handicapped vis-a-vis the
executive. Numerical weakness of the
opposition members of parliament (MPs) and
an unquestioned loyalty of the ruling party
MPs to the executive government reduced the
first four JSs to rubberstamp bodies. Sheikh
Mujib, Ziaur Rahman and Ershad used the JS
as their personal institutions. The JS
seemed ever-prepared to give legislative
approval even to the most authoritarian
policy proposals and constitutional
amendments.
None of the first four parliaments could
complete its five-year term. They all were
dissolved prematurely. Military takeovers
caused the dissolution of the first two JSs,
and the third and fourth parliaments were
dissolved in the face of irresistible
movements for the restoration of democratic
rights.
Any large organization has to work in an
environment of conflict and consensus. This
is more so when the organization is
predominantly of a political nature. Since
mutually conflicting interests are
represented in a legislature, the prevalence
of an environment of conflict can be well
presumed. But, very often, consensus emerges
among the actors involved in the conflict
and this contributes to the endurance of the
representative system.
This is not to argue that legislative
conflict is entirely dysfunctional; rather
it has a highly functional aspect. Conflict
dictates the actors involved in it to behave
in a sensible manner and keeps them alert
about the probable scrutiny that might
originate with any unacceptable behaviour.
Diamond has explored the challenges of
maintaining and institutionalizing democracy
by analyzing three tensions or "paradoxes"
intrinsic to all democracies and
particularly troubling for the emerging
ones. The first, and perhaps the foremost,
among these tensions, is the tension between
conflict and consensus. Dissension and
division are inherent in democracy's very
nature. Any attempt by those in power to
suppress dissension adds only fuel to the
political conflict and thereby makes it more
intense, which may ultimately lead to the
breakdown of the system.
Therefore, dissent and division in a
democracy should be on a basis of consent
and cohesion. Too much conflict and least
consensus jeopardizes the stability of a
political system. To enable a democratic
system to survive some required elements of
political culture are: a degree of restraint
in one's partisanship; considerable trust
and minimum of suspicion in rival political
actors; tolerance of opposition and
criticism; and readiness to compromise,
accommodate, and cooperate.
We, therefore, can assume that parliamentary
conflict within certain limits is
functional, but too much of it is entirely
dysfunctional and may make a society so
conflict-ridden that civil peace and
political stability become virtually
impossible to achieve. Making a
parliamentary system work to the
satisfaction of the electorate is as much a
responsibility of the opposition bench as it
is of the treasury.
Bangladesh's familiarity with parliament is
much longer than many other developing
countries. But the country could make very
little headway towards the consolidation and
institutionalization of legislative process.
For a number of reasons the focus of the
paper is on the JSs of 1990s, especially the
fifth and seventh. First, these two JSs were
elected under the supervision of neutral
caretaker governments (NCGs) and were widely
commended, both at home and abroad, as free,
fair, and impartial. Therefore, the
legitimacy of these parliaments is beyond
any controversy.
Second, the first four and sixth JS
elections were held under partisan
governments and are alleged to be
considerably rigged. The parliaments these
elections produced could not work as
effective representative bodies.
Third, excepting a brief period, from 1972
to 1990 the parliament (when it existed at
all) worked under a presidential system
where the presidents had effective formal
and informal mechanisms at their disposal to
make the MPs belonging to the majority party
behave the way they (the presidents)
desired.
Finally, from September 1991 the JS began to
operate within the framework of a
parliamentary system. Free and fair
elections coupled with the reversion to
parliamentary system aroused public
expectation very high about the performance
of the fifth and seventh JSs. It should,
however, be mentioned here at the risk of
repetition that the tenure of the sixth JS
was only twelve days.
By 'parliamentary' politics this paper means
politics that revolved around issues that
came up for discussion, debate and decision
in the Bangladesh parliament. It refers to
politics that originated from the conviction
of the opposition legislators that the
treasury bench and/or the Speaker denied
their lawful rights and privileges. In this
article an attempt has been made to argue
that although there were very few instances
of government-opposition consensus, the
magnitude of conflict was often too high for
the JS to work as a vital policy-making
institution.
The article analyzes some major events of
the JS of 1990s and seeks to demonstrate
that although in rare occasions
government-opposition consensus could be
achieved, intense conflict between the two
major parliamentary parties (AL and BNP)
reduced the JS to an ineffective assembly.
The developments in parliamentary politics
after December 1999 have not been analyzed
in this study.
Reversion to parliamentary system: an
example of consensus
On the basis of the result of fifth
parliamentary elections, the BNP, under the
leadership of Khaleda Zia, the widow of
Ziaur Rahman, formed the government in March
1991. The joint declaration of the AL-led
eight-party alliance, BNP-backed seven-party
alliance, and the left-oriented five-party
alliance that precipitated the dethroning of
Ershad in December 1990 read, "the interim,
caretaker government will hand over power to
the sovereign parliament, elected through
free and fair elections, and the government
will remain accountable to that parliament".
Immediately after the formation of
government by BNP, the AL and its political
allies reiterated their earlier pledge to
make the parliament sovereign and make the
government accountable to such a parliament.
They promised to put pressure on the ruling
party to materialize the joint declaration
of the three alliances.
The pressure on the governing party for a
sovereign parliament mounted in the first
session of the fifth JS. Addressing its
inaugural session the Acting President,
Shahabuddin Ahmed, emphasized: "though the
(joint) declaration does not bear any
constitutional validity, it has sufficient
political significance".
The Acting President gained deep respect of
the nation by projecting his political
neutrality and restoring the sanctity of the
electoral process. His statement in the JS
helped to strengthen the demand for a
sovereign parliament. In the opening session
of parliament many opposition MPs pleaded
for a reversion to parliamentary system. The
socio-cultural organizations of the
professionals that played a vital role in
deposing the Ershad government put pressure
on the BNP government to establish a
sovereign parliament.
In April 1991, Abdus Samad Azad, the Deputy
Leader of Opposition in the JS, served a
notice of constitution amendment bill
proposing a switch over to parliamentary
system. Although Khaleda Zia, the Prime
Minister and the Leader of the House,
maintained a stoic silence over the issue,
other leading BNP politicians rejected the
proposal outright. Some of the arguments
they frequently put forward in favour of
retaining the presidential system were: the
words "sovereign parliament" in the joint
declaration did not necessarily point to the
introduction of a parliamentary system and a
parliamentary system might give rise to
instability at the nascent stage of
democratic development.
In an inner debate in the BNP Parliamentary
Party (BNPPP) three different opinions
emerged. Some MPs favoured a switch over to
parliamentary system, some others voiced
their opinion in favour of retaining the
presidential system, and still others
expressed a preference for a blending of the
presidential and parliamentary systems.
The JP, previously an ardent defender of
presidential system, softened its stand and
announced that it would not resist a bill
proposing a change in the form of
government. The Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh
(JIB), the fourth largest party in the fifth
JS, also started to plead for a reversion to
parliamentary system.
The MPs of all minor parties and also the
independents made known their preference for
a change in the form of government. A solid
unity among the opposition forces helped to
place the demand forcefully. It was an
uncomfortable situation for the BNP,
especially because, since its birth the
party had consistently advocated a
presidential form of government and it was
clearly enshrined as one of the ideals in
the party manifesto.
Dr
Mahfuzul H. Chowdhury is professor of
political science at Chittagong University,
Bangladesh
Dr Mohammad A. Hakim is professor of
political science at Chittagong University,
Bangladesh
This volume has been published in memory of
Dr Mahfuzul Haq, a leading political
scientist who died in a helicopter crash in
1966. Several renowned scholars have
contributed eleven essays to this volume
covering the political system, public
policy, local administration, foreign
policy, national security, ethnicity and
religion in Bangladesh.
The first four parliamentary elections held
between 1973 and 1988 were alleged to be
considerably flawed although the intensity
of electoral frauds varied...The major
purpose of these elections was not to offer
the electorate an opportunity to exercise
the right to vote, but to convince the donor
countries and organizations that a
democratically elected government was in
power. |
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