|
Ali M. Ansari,
a British academic scholar of Iranian
origin, has written a very engaging book to
capture the perplexing times in Iran during
the 20th century, what he calls A History
of Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and
After. Iran, renamed from Persia, by the
first Pahlavi (Shah) Reza Khan in 1935 has
remained an enigmatic country. There have
been revolutionary changes, but continuity
of the old mores in imperial past formulates
the genre of Iranian society.
There are nine chapters, including the
introduction and conclusion. Key chapters,
"Reza Khan and the establishment of the
Pahlavi State", and "The White Revolution"
give the background to the rise and fall of
the only two members of the self-created
Pahlavi dynasty - father and son - between
1921 and 1979. After Khomeini's revolution,
and the US induced war with Iraq, the new
generation was rejuventated for upholding
sovereign terms of existence.
In the introduction, Ansari lays out his
analytical framework: "This is fundamentally
a book about change and the politics of
managing that change, as successive
governments and political elites sought, and
continues to seek. To navigate a stable and
sustainable route from a perception of
tradition to a particular conception of
modernity."
Iran has to be analyzed structurally with an
imperial past and continually updating
vibrant cultural mores. Tradition and
modernity have distinct historical growth in
which four segments played a pivotal role:
aristocracy, ulema, intelligentsia/
intellectuals and bazaaris, interlinked with
one another.
The role of the ulema in Iranian history has
been described as a catalyst of change,
rather than any permanency of
fundamentalism. The Safavid Dynasty
(1502-1737) utilized them as the tool of
their newly established religious
legitimacy. The Qajars (1796-1925)
institutionalized them, for the convenience
of revenue generating seminaries. In the
constitutional crisis of 1906, the clergy
played a progressive role in neutralizing
the royal power, and combating direct
foreign intervention. In opposing the Shah's
regime, clergy was supported by all
progressive forces during 1960s and 70s.
The author questions Hegelian's idea that
the 'East' is unhistorical, where change
does not occur. He points out with
concurrent turmoil in the Middle East,
"whether history had stood still or not in
the East, the West seemed determined to
bring it to a standstill."
In 1925, after installing with intrigues, a
soldier of Cossack Brigade as the Shah,
founder of implanted royalty, the British
called him "Iranian noble savage". But, he
had his own agenda, partly influenced by
Ataturk who had established a new Republic
in neighbouring Turkey. Ansari postulates
that Reza Khan was the quintessential
modernizer, with eccentric ideas. This
alarmed his mentors, replacing him by his
son.
Mohammed Reza Shah (1941-79) created his own
fancy modernization under the hegemony of
the United States. He alienated all segments
of the society. His fantasyland was
inhabited by a few courtiers in the dreams
of a 'Shah's magic kingdom'.
He was called, 'Shahenshah' the king of
kings and crowned himself with fanfare
witnessed by the West, in awe and amusement.
His nationalism was based on the politics of
perpetuating dynastic control. The Iranians
were not impressed by the so-called
modernization agenda, in which development
projects were confined to the needs of
'royal' whims.
The aristocracy, the ulema, and the bazaaris
had profound roots in society, and with each
other, in kinship associations, as well as
commercial and social relations. The Shah
had become immune to all this, and stood
alone with his peculiar design for an
ancient empire, now built on a 'sandy oil
castle'.
Ansari postulates that Mohammed Reza Shah
was a curious amalgam of 'modernizer' and
traditional patrimonial monarch. He saw
himself as the living embodiment of an
Iranian tradition of enlightenment;
quasi-divine monarchy going back to Cyrus
the Great. The White Revolution was launched
in 1961 with an autocratic style, that the
Shah alone knew best. When he found no
takers for his Revolution, a guided 1963
referendum produced 99% endorsement from
those who cared to vote. The US President
Kennedy sent congratulations for the farce.
Westernization with American style consumer
oriented industrialization and foreign
fashions were unacceptable by the
nationalist elements: ulema and baazaris,
became the catalyst for Khomeni's call for
change.
The 1979 revolution became enigmatic with
Islamic symbols but ushered renaissance for
Iranian cultural nationalism. The very
concept of Velayat-i-fiqih, incorporated in
the constitution, turned into democratic
debates by intellectuals and younger
generation, especially women who asserted
their rights with intellectual rigour.
The author uses an interesting term "weapons
of the weak" to underscore the Iranian way
of dealing with strong adversary military
powers.
Actually aware of their own military
weakness, but driven by ambitions of
imperial stature inherited from an earlier
age, Iranian statesmen have substituted
diplomacy for military power and have shown
a diplomatic sophistication which often
confounded both partners and opponents."
This diplomatic weapon has remained a
testimony to the fine cruising during
Afghan-Soviet-American entanglements in the
1980s and Middle East turmoil of 1990s. In
recent years, with refined diplomacy,
President Khatami has called for "dialogue
of civilizations" among nations and within
his own country.
It should be pointed out that the political
structure of Iran remains complex because it
represents an intricate tapestry of social
and political classes in the process of
dynamic change, reflecting the conflicting
tendencies inherent in the transformation of
traditional structures into 'modern' ones.
Its very fluidity means that any analysis
that does not take into account this
dynamism is limited to being a mere
snapshot, a one-dimensional model in the
process of continuous formation. This is the
dilemma of foreign observers, who don't
understand theoretical or practical
implications of Iranian complexity. Karl
Mannheim had aptly observed:
"In a realm in which everything is in the
process of becoming, the only adequate
synthesis would be a dynamic one, which is
reformulated from time to time."
This is where the US imperial policy makers
have to understand that Iran has its own
dynamic complexity. Nikki Keddie, a modern
day American scholar pleads that her
countrymen should have sense of history, in
order to have peaceful co-existence with
Iran. Empires have fought battles in that
region, but people have remained sovereign
in their psychology and updating cultural
consciousness.
Finally, the book has a crucial message.
Iran has gone through a variety of crisis,
with foreign intrigues and occupation, but
far from history being written by the
victors, it was overwhelmingly the victims
who determined its direction. |
